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Abstract: The health sector reform programme which began in Vietnam in 1989 
in order to improve the efficiency of the health system has altered the way in 
which Vietnamese hospitals operate. The programme put the spotlight on input 
savings. This study aims to examine the relative efficiency of hospitals during 
the health reform process and assess – by looking at the relative efficiency of 
hospitals – the effects of the regulatory changes. The study employs the DEA 
two-stage approach referring to data from 101 general public hospitals over the 
period 1998-2006. The study revealed that there was evidence of improvement 
in the productivity of Vietnamese hospitals over the period 1998-2006, with a 
progress in total factor productivity of 1.4% per year. Furthermore, the 
differences in hospital efficiency can be attributed to both the regulatory 
changes and hospital-specific characteristics. The user fees and autonomy 
measures were found to increase technical efficiency. Provincial hospitals were 
revealed to be more technically efficient than their central counterparts and 
hospitals located in the North East, South East and Mekong River Delta regions 
performed better than hospitals from other regions.  
October 2008 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285505
 
2 
 
JEL Classification Codes: I18, I19 
Keywords: changes in public policy, health services, data envelopment 
analysis, hospital, regulatory changes 
 
Acknowledgements:  
The support of the Economic and Social Research Council is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
Contact details: 
Pinar Guven Uslu, Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich, 
Norfolk, NR4 7TJ, UK. 
p.guven@uea.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
 
Efficiency in the provision of health care is a major issue facing the health 
systems across different countries. The demand for health care is large and 
increasing over time due to a growing and an ageing population. However, 
resources for health care provision are limited and governments have limited 
resources to finance the rising demand for increased and better quality 
services. Accordingly, a wide range of health sector reforms has been 
undertaken across countries since the 1980s in order to create a competitive 
market environment and improve the efficiency of the health systems (World 
Bank, 1987; Ancarani et al., 2008). Theoretically, the health sector reform – 
based on regulation theories such as public interest theory (Peltzman, 1976; 
Kahn, 1988; Spulber, 1989), regulatory capture theory (Feroz, 1987; Reagan, 
1987), and economic theory of regulation (Stigler, 1968, 1971; Posner, 1974; 
Meier, 1985) – can affect the survival and even change the goals of hospitals, 
and then hospitals tend to respond to these changes through their improvement 
of productive efficiency. Therefore, the improvement of efficiency of the health 
systems, including the hospital sector, is the central concern of health decision 
makers, facility managers, and the public; and the topic of the impacts of reform 
process, in terms of regulatory changes, on hospital efficiency is frequently 
discussed across different health systems. 
 
However, the results of these reforms are different depending on the specific 
contexts. The amount of variation in countries’ approaches to reform – focusing 
on changes to the finance of health services, changes in the incentive structure, 
or changes in the organisational structure of the health care system – indicates 
that there is no consensus on an optimal reform programme, nor on how much 
account a programme should take of country-specific factors. Even when reform 
frameworks appear to go in the right direction, some issues in the 
implementation of reform remain (Berman, 1995). The results from previous 
studies on the impacts of reform on hospital efficiency have been mixed. In 
some cases it has been argued that reform programmes have improved 
hospital efficiency (Maniadakis et al., 1999; Chu et al., 2004) whereas other 
programmes – such as those of the US, the UK, and Finland – have been 
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argued to have had virtually no impact on efficiency (Bradford and Craycraft, 
1996; Ferrari, 2006; Linna, 1998). In some other cases, health reform 
programmes have even been argued to have led to a reduction in measured 
efficiency (Steinmann and Zweifel, 2003). 
 
Among the regulatory changes of the health sector reform process, the changes 
to the finance of hospitals are considered an important influence on hospital 
efficiency, and are of interest to many researchers, to the public and to 
regulators. The regulatory changes in hospital financing can include changes in 
the payment method of hospitals from the retrospective to prospective base or 
from the global budget to activity-based mechanism, the introduction of 
capitation contracts, and the restructuring of the financing system with the 
implementation of a health insurance programme. These changes restructure 
hospital finance, thereby altering hospital operations in terms of medical input 
and service provision. Chang (1998) and Rosko (1999) indicate that changes in 
the financing mechanism of public hospitals can increase financial pressures 
and highlight hospital performance improvement. Many empirical studies show 
that regulatory changes in the finance of hospitals have no or few positive 
impacts on hospital efficiency. For example, Chern and Wan (2000) and Borden 
(1988) found that the prospective payment mechanism has no positive effect on 
hospital efficiency. However, some positive relationships between changes in 
financial policy and hospital efficiency were found in the studies on capitation 
contracts by Chu et al., (2004), on activity-based financing programmes by Biørn 
et al., (2003), and the national health insurance programme by Chang (1998). 
 
The Vietnamese hospital sector has undergone considerable structural and 
institutional changes as a result of the recent health sector reform process. 
These structural and institutional changes have resulted from the transformation 
of the economy from a centrally-planned one to a market-based one, from the 
lack of health service provision, and under-funding. The combination of these 
things led to deficiencies and inefficiencies in the health system. Therefore, 
since the 1990s a series of structural and institutional reforms has been 
introduced, whose main objectives were to meet the increasing demand for 
health services, and to boost the efficiency and productivity of the health system 
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in general – and hospitals in particular – by restructuring the financing 
mechanism, reducing government intervention, and introducing elements of 
market forces into the health care system. These changes in both structural and 
institutional conditions altered the way in which Vietnamese hospitals operated 
and have put the spotlight on resource savings. Along with the approval of 
private hospitals, the most obvious changes in the past two decades in the 
hospital sector are the changes in financing and in managerial structure, 
through the introduction of user fees and health insurance programmes, and the 
granting of managerial autonomy to public hospitals. 
 
Before the reform process, the Vietnamese hospitals were entirely funded by 
the government. However, with the introduction of user fees and health 
insurance programmes, the financial structure of hospitals has been diversified. 
This has had mixed effects on hospitals. On the one hand, hospitals now have, 
along with financial support from the state budget, the other financial sources of 
user charges and health insurance reimbursement. On the other hand, the 
government subsidies to hospitals have gradually decreased, resulting in the 
growing importance of the alternative financial sources of user fees and health 
insurance. As a result, Vietnamese hospitals are facing financial pressures, and 
to overcome these pressures they are expected to improve their performance. 
In other words, it is hoped that the nature of user fees and health insurance, 
and the systems that they create, will encourage improvements in performance 
of hospitals. The change in managerial structure, for example the greater right 
to use operational expenditure and revenues or the new flexibility in employing 
the necessary personnel, is also hoped to encourage the further improvement 
of hospital performance.   
 
Inspired by an empirical literature which has investigated the effect of the health 
reform process on hospital efficiency, the Vietnamese hospital sector during this 
period of structural change provides an interesting case study with which to 
investigate efficiency and assess the determinants of hospital efficiency. The 
study, therefore, aims to analyse the relative efficiency of hospitals during the 
health reform process, particularly with regard to the change in the financial and 
managerial structures in the hospital sector, and give an answer for the 
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question: have the regulatory changes in their financial and managerial 
structure improved the efficiency and productivity of Vietnamese hospitals over 
the period 1998-2006?  
 
This study is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the health 
care system in Vietnam. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on hospital 
performance. The model of the relations between production efficiency and 
regulatory changes in financial and managerial structures is outlined in section 
4. Section 5 provides the data envelopment analysis methodology, the data set 
and the results of the hospital efficiency analysis. Section 6 presents the result 
of the Tobit regression analysis concerning the effects of regulatory changes on 
hospital efficiency and Section 7 discusses the conclusions and implications of 
this study.  
 
 
2. The Vietnamese Health Care System during the Reform Period 
 
The Vietnamese health system, based on the national administrative structure, 
is vertically divided into four tiers: central, provincial, district, and communal. 
These tiers are closely related to each other, with the higher tiers assisting the 
lower ones in terms of providing professional medical operations and 
techniques. At the central tier, the Ministry of Health governs the health system 
and is responsible for managing and monitoring the performance of the various 
sections of the health system. At the second tier, there are 64 Provincial Health 
Services, which are responsible for the strategic management of health care 
services in their provinces as well as for supervising the performance of public 
hospitals, preventive health centres, and medical and pharmaceutical training 
units. There are 659 District Health Bureaus at the level below the Provincial 
Health Services. These District Health Bureaus oversee the operations of 
district hospitals, district preventive care centres and communal health centres 
in their provision of basic health care to the district inhabitants. Finally, 
communal health centres are the first point of contact for communal residents at 
the communal tier and are supervised by District Health Bureaus. 
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Health care services are carried out by both private and public health providers 
in the Vietnamese health care system. The public health providers include 
health care centres and public hospitals. The private health providers consist of 
private clinics and private hospitals. Among these public and private health care 
providers, hospitals play important roles in the health system, especially in the 
improvement of the overall health of the public. There are 1,053 hospitals with 
143,999 beds active in the health care system, including 1,002 public hospitals 
and 51 private hospitals. Of these public hospitals, there are 79 hospitals 
managed by other ministries such as the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of 
Transportation, Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, and Ministry of 
Agriculture. The remainder belongs to the Ministry of Health, which include 30 
central, 304 provincial and 589 district hospitals distributed on the basis of 
administrative territories and demand for services across 61 provinces in 8 
regions. The private hospitals, including 36 general hospitals and 15 specialty 
hospitals, aim to deliver health services to middle- and high-income people. 
 
Vietnam has been spending a significant proportion of its wealth on health, 
approximately 5.1% of gross domestic product (GDP) per year. Currently, the 
health care finance comes from two sources, public and private ones. The 
former source consists of revenue from direct and indirect taxes and the latter 
source consists of direct payments from patients and health insurance 
schemes. Of these two sources, health care expenditure has been increasingly 
financed by private sources. During the period 1990-2005, the government 
spent, on average, around 1.5% of its GDP on health, accounting for only 5% to 
7% of the annual government spending, and the role of the government in 
financing the health sector has gradually decreased, from 32.7% of total health 
expenditure in 1998 to 22.6% in 2005. The total private spending on health, 
however, has increased 2.7 times in nominal terms, from US$ 0.76 billion to 
2.06 billion. This means that the private percentage of health expenditure has 
risen from 67.3 % in 1998 to 77.4% in 2005.  
 
Most of the public funds and a large part of the private funds are spent on public 
health facilities, in which public hospitals consume approximately 40% of the 
total health expenditure. The structure of financial sources for public hospitals, 
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as presented in Figure 1, therefore, can partly illustrate both the public and 
private expenditure on health. It can be observed in the figure that public 
hospitals have four financial sources: the state budget, reimbursement from 
health insurance, direct patient payments (user fees), and domestic or foreign 
aid.  The figure also shows that the government budget is still an important 
financial source for public hospitals during 1994-2006. However, the proportion 
provided by the government budget in terms of the total financial sources of 
public hospitals has considerably declined from 68.4% in 1994 to 32% in 2006. 
The most important financial source – although only by a small margin – is now 
direct patient payments. The percentage of user fees in financing hospitals has 
increased over time, from 23.2% of total revenues of public hospitals in 1994 to 
33% in 2006. The percentage of revenue coming from health insurance 
reimbursement has also gradually increased from 7.2% to 28%. 
 
To summarise, the public sector still plays a crucial role in the provision of 
health services. However, the private sector, through direct payment or health 
insurance schemes, now contributes more financially to the health system than 
the public one. In terms of the volume of resources consumed, though, the 
performance of public facilities, particularly public hospitals, is still more 
important than private health providers in determining the performance of the 
health care system.  
 
 Figure 1: Financial Sources in Hospitals 1994-2006 
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3. Hospital Efficiency: Literature Review 
 
There has been an extensive amount of literature examining the performance of 
the health care sector. Studies, which focus on efficiency and productivity using 
frontier techniques, have been undertaken in all areas of the health sector: from 
primary care to secondary care, tertiary care to nursing home care, as well as 
from the overall health system to health care providers, administration bodies, 
and subgroups in health care providers such as departments and professionals. 
The review of efficiency studies in the health care sector has been undertaken 
in the studies of Hollingsworth et al. (1999), Hollingsworth (2003), and 
Worthington (2004). Of the empirical studies on efficiency in the health care 
sector, many have investigated the performance of hospitals in relation to the 
health reform process, particularly in financing reform. These empirical studies 
analysed the performance of hospitals under regulatory changes in hospital 
finance of the US, Norway, Spain, and Taiwan among others.  
 
In the US, the effects of the prospective payment mechanism, based on 
diagnosis-related groups, on hospital efficiency, were first assessed in the 
Borden (1988) study. The new payment mechanism was implemented in turn by 
52 New Jersey hospitals during a three-year period, so hospitals were grouped 
depending on the year that reimbursement was initially employed. The author 
purported to examine two hypotheses: that the efficiency of all the hospitals was 
not different, irrespective of starting year of new reimbursement implementation; 
and that there was no improvement in hospital efficiency over time. The results 
supported the latter hypothesis that the new mechanism had no positive effect 
on efficiency. In addition, it was found that those hospitals that had experienced 
the shortest time in the new programme had the lowest average efficiency level 
over years, whilst the other hospitals had the same level of efficiency, 
irrespective of the length of time since implementation.  
 
Chern and Wan (2000) studied the impact of the implementation of a 
prospective payment system on a sample of 80 non-profit Virginian hospitals. 
Their findings supported the results of Borden’s study (1988) that there was no 
positive effect gained from the implementation of prospective payment system 
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on hospitals. It was also found that the prospective payment system slightly 
reduced the efficiency scores of the hospitals and expanded the gap between 
the inefficient and efficient hospitals. The authors suggested that the new policy, 
to some extent, influenced the economies of scales and resulted in the higher 
percentage of large-sized hospitals among efficient hospitals, and that each 
hospital seemed to have developed a distinctive strategy in response to the new 
prospective payment system policy.   
 
The effects of the changes in the financing method for hospitals, in particular 
the implementation of capitated contracting, on 246 Californian hospitals’ 
efficiency were examined in Chu et al. (2004). The results from the DEA and 
two simultaneous Tobit and Probit regression analyses revealed that those 
hospitals that had had the capitated contracting were less efficient than those 
not involved. It was also found that the efficiency of hospitals increased 
alongside higher involvement with this contracting. The authors suggested that 
this may have been due to the fact that inefficient hospitals were likely to 
participate in capitation in order to improve their efficiency, or that the efficient 
hospitals already had better management methods than using capitated 
contracting. 
 
Aside from some studies of the impacts of regulatory changes in hospital 
finance on hospital efficiency in the US, researchers have also been interested 
in the financing reforms in the hospital sectors in Spain, Norway and Taiwan. 
The technical efficiency of public Spanish hospitals under ‘Program-Contracts’ 
financing reforms was examined and the relationship between technical 
efficiency and unit costs was evaluated by Lopez-Valcarcel and Perez (1996). 
They employed DEA models and the cost stochastic frontier model upon data 
from 75 hospitals during the three years of 1991-1993. They found in both the 
DEA and cost frontier models that the technical efficiency of the hospitals 
improved over the period being analysed after the introduction of program-
contracts. The results from the Tobit regression model, used to investigate the 
importance of hospital size, location and subcontracts on hospital efficiency, 
indicated that hospitals located in Madrid were more efficient than others 
elsewhere, and hospitals subcontracting out services performed better than 
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others. In addition, the findings revealed that technical efficiency was 
significantly associated with unit costs, whilst subcontracting and the rate of 
capacity utilisation did not significantly affect the unit costs.  
 
In Norway, Biørn et al. (2003) used the panel data of 48 somatic hospitals from 
the 9 years of 1992-2000 to analyse the impact of the activity-based financing 
policy and some hospital characteristics on hospital efficiency. The findings 
supported the hypothesis that technical efficiency, on average, improved under 
the initiative of the activity-based financing programme. However the effect of 
the programme on cost efficiency was found to be inconsistent. The authors 
also found that there was no significant difference in efficiency between the 
hospitals with or without activity-based financing contracts in the years following 
the introduction of the policy.   
 
In Taiwan, hospital efficiency was investigated in relation to the National Health 
Insurance programme in the studies of Chang (1998) and Chen (2006). Chang 
(1998) examined the effects of the implementation of National Health Insurance, 
which restructured the finance of hospitals and impacted on three hospital 
characteristics – scope of services, proportion of retired veteran patients and 
the occupancy rate – on the relative efficiency of 6 government-owned hospitals 
in Taiwan during the five-year period of 1990-1994. The hospitals’ efficiency 
scores as calculated by the DEA model were regressed using econometric 
regression models. The findings indicated that the overall efficiency of 
government-owned hospitals improved during the implementation of the 
National Health Insurance programme. It was found that scope of services and 
proportion of retired veterans were significantly negatively related to hospital 
efficiency, whilst the occupancy rate was significantly positively associated with 
hospital performance.  
 
The effect of the National Health Insurance (NHI) reform in Taiwan on hospital 
efficiency and productivity was further evaluated by Chen (2006). He used the 
DEA CRS and VRS models, Malmquist index approach, Tobit, and OLS 
regression models on data from 40 hospitals, including 18 public and 22 private 
hospitals, during the pre-launched, launched and post-launched period of NHI 
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policy from 1994 to 1998. It was found that a large number of hospitals 
regressed in terms of productivity due to the decrease in technological and 
quality attributes, whilst they became more efficient over the period studied. The 
study also revealed that National Health Insurance implementation was 
significantly positively related to hospital productivity and quality, but negatively 
associated with efficiency due to the increased utilisation of resources. Public 
hospitals were found to be less efficient in the single-period assessment but 
gained more efficiency and less service quality in the mixed-period investigated.  
 
Although these studies have found that regulatory reforms, particularly changes 
in hospital finance, have a significant effect on hospital efficiency in developed 
countries there is no research relating to the hospital sector in Vietnam. There is 
a study being conducted to measure the efficiency of Vietnamese hospitals; 
however it does not take into account the impacts of regulatory changes and 
hospital characteristics on hospital efficiency. This study, therefore, is an 
attempt to fill the gap in the existing literature relating to Vietnamese hospitals 
and tries to explore the determinants influencing the efficiency of hospitals.  
 
 
4. The Model  
 
To measure efficiency of health care organisations, two different frontier 
methodologies, stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), are widely used. These methods were developed based on the 
concepts of efficiency measurement introduced by Farrell (1957). Farrell (1957) 
distinguished two mutually exclusive and exhaustive sources of productive 
efficiency: technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, which are then 
combined to provide a measure of total economic efficiency. The key to 
measuring technical efficiency and allocative efficiency is the estimation of the 
best practice production frontier (isoquant) against which each individual 
decision making unit (DMU) is to be compared. Accordingly, SFA and DEA 
methodologies use different techniques to envelope data, either statistical or 
mathematical programming, respectively. To that end, they make different 
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accommodations for the structure of production technology, for random noise 
and for the measurement of efficiency.   
 
There is a longstanding debate on how to measure the technical efficiency of 
health facilities. The cornerstone of the discussion is the problem of choosing 
the appropriate methodology, either DEA or SFA, for constructing an efficient 
frontier that encompasses best-practice hospitals, so that other hospitals can 
subsequently be compared with this efficiency benchmark. Some comparisons 
between frontier techniques in measuring hospital efficiency have been made 
(e.g. Chiriko and Sear, 2000; Jacobs, 2001; Gannon, 2005, among others). 
These studies showed that despite the intense research efforts, there is still no 
consensus to the best method for measuring frontier efficiency in hospitals. 
What the researchers have done so far is to highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of these two techniques, but there is a lack of agreement regarding 
a preferred frontier model. Therefore, this paper will choose the DEA approach 
in order to measure the efficiency of the Vietnamese hospitals for the two 
following reasons. First, as indicated by Osei et al. (2005) in their study of 
efficiency in Ghana hospitals and Valdmanis et al. (2004) in their study of 
efficiency in Thai hospitals, the application of DEA is likely to be suitable in low-
income countries. They showed that DEA analysis is useful when working with 
insufficient health sector information, and particularly when the price data is 
missing.  
 
Second, the preference for DEA is driven by considering its advantages and 
disadvantages as opposed to SFA. The important advantage of the DEA 
method is that it requires no pre-specification of a functional form, resulting in 
no prior requirement of distributional form for the inefficiency terms. It can 
simultaneously accommodate multiple inputs and outputs, and enable a 
decomposition of the efficiency measurement into several components. This 
provides an aid to management in its search for sources of inefficiency. 
Furthermore, DEA is less ‘data-intensive’ than econometric methods because it 
does not require a relatively large sample size, information on prices of inputs 
and outputs, nor transformation of input and output physical units into any other 
single unit measure. However, DEA also has some drawbacks. It is sensitive to 
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outliers and measurement errors. DEA is deterministic; hence, it also assumes 
that no random error exists in data.  
 
Although it has some problems, DEA seems to be more appropriate to measure 
the efficiency than SFA in hospitals where there is multiple-output production 
and it is difficult to obtain input and output price data or to set behavioural 
assumptions such as profit maximisation or cost minimisation (Coelli et al., 
2005). Therefore, in order to measure efficiency and productivity of Vietnamese 
hospitals as well as to explain the relationships between hospital efficiency and 
regulatory changes and hospital characteristics, the two-stage DEA approach 
was used. Figure 2 below depicts the two-stage framework of this study.  
 
Figure 2: Steps of Two-Stage Analysis for Investigating Hospital Efficiency 
 
 
In the first-stage DEA of the study, two inputs (beds and personnel) and three 
outputs (outpatient visits, inpatient days, and surgical operations) are used to 
measure hospital efficiency and productivity. As the concentration of this study 
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is the technical efficiency of Vietnamese hospitals, hence, the production 
process employed is based on the process approach, in which the intermediate 
outputs provided by hospitals are used. The selection of these input and output 
variables is also derived from consultancy of hospital managers and 
administrators of functional departments of the Vietnamese Ministry of Health. 
The main results from the DEA are the technical efficiency scores for individual 
hospitals and total factor productivity during the sample period 1998-2006. In 
the second stage of the study, the efficiency scores obtained from the DEA first 
stage are used as dependent variables and they are regressed against a set of 
environmental variables (regulatory changes in financial and managerial 
structures of hospitals and hospital-specific characteristics) using a Tobit model.  
 
 
5. The DEA First Stage Analysis 
 
5.1 The DEA Methodology and Malmquist Total Factor Productivity 
 Index 
Data envelopment analysis method (DEA) constructs production frontiers and 
measures the efficiency of a decision making unit (DMU) relative to these 
constructed frontiers using a mathematical programming technique. This 
method was first developed by Charnes et al. (1978) (CCR model), based on 
the work of Farrell (1957) on efficiency measurement. The CCR model assumes 
a production technology with constant returns to scale, implying that any 
proportional change in inputs usage results in the same proportional change in 
outputs. It was then extended by Banker et al. (1984) (BCC model). The BCC 
model relaxes the assumption of constant returns to scale to allow for variable 
returns to scale. The paper, in the first stage, employs the BCC model to 
measure the relative efficiency of hospitals. The input-oriented BCC model is 
formulated as follows:  
M   in o oE θ=    
 
1
subject to        o io
n
k ik
k
iX Xλ θ
=
≤ ∀∑    
        
1
    
n
rok rk
k
rY Yλ
=
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where:  oθ represents the efficiency score of DMU0, which is within a range 
from zero to one and a higher score implies a higher efficiency; kλ  is non-
negative values related to the kth DMU. 
 
In this stage, the DEA-based Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) index 
approach (Färe et al., 1994) is also used to measure the productivity changes of 
DMUs at different points in time, identify the sources of productivity changes, 
and decompose total productivity change into technical efficiency change (the 
catch-up effect) and technological change (the frontier shift effect). The TFP 
change index between period ( )t  and period ( 1)t + is given by: 
 
1/ 21 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )( , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
I I
I I
t t t t t t t t t
I t t t t t t t t t
t t t t I
I
D Y X D Y X D Y XM Y X Y X
D Y X D Y X D Y X
+ + + + +
+ + + +
+ +  
 
  
=
 (2) 
 
where the notion ID  denotes the input-based distance function, and IM  is the 
product of technical efficiency change and technological change. The part 
outside the square brackets of the equation represents the technical efficiency 
change between period ( )t and period ( 1)t + , which denotes the ratio of Farrell 
technical efficiency in period ( 1)t + over the technical efficiency in period ( )t . 
Technical efficiency change indicates whether a unit comes closer to (or further 
away from) its production frontier when moving from period ( )t to period ( 1)t + . 
The remaining part inside the square brackets is a measure of technological 
change. It is the geometric mean of the shift in the production frontier observed 
at tY and the shift in the production frontier observed at 1tY + . Technological 
change indicates whether the production frontier has shifted between two 
periods ( )t and ( 1)t +  evaluated. 
 
 
 
 17 
5.2 Input and Output Data 
Data for this study were obtained from the database on the hospitals of the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Health and cover a period of 9 years from 1998-2006. 
The sample hospitals used in this study were the 101 general public hospitals 
over a total of 116 hospitals belonging to the sample under consideration. 
Central general hospitals and provincial general hospitals, operating as either 
the tertiary or main secondary centres, were chosen because they consume the 
largest part of the health resources in the health care system and their 
performance will have a significant influence on the health services provided 
and the health status of the overall population. The general district hospitals 
were taken out of the sample because they are of a small size and provide 
fewer kinds of health services than the sampled hospitals. The health services 
provided in district hospitals are also much less complicated and at a lower 
quality than that of the central and provincial counterparts. The specialty central 
and provincial hospitals have distinct missions, unique production processes, 
and serve distinct patients as compared to each other and to general hospitals, 
which would have resulted in a heterogeneous sample. In addition, due to the 
elimination of some inaccurate and missing values, 15 provincial hospitals were 
excluded. As a result, the sample had 101 hospitals, including 9 central 
hospitals monitored by the Ministry of Health and 98 provincial hospitals 
monitored by Provincial Health Services. 
 
Regarding the output variables, following the hospital efficiency studies by Hu 
and Huang (2004), Chang et al. (2004), hospital outputs in this study are 
proxied by outpatient visits (Y1), inpatient days (Y2) and surgical operations 
(Y3) performed. Firstly, outpatient visits (Y1) are chosen as an output, which 
include both the scheduled visits to physicians and the unscheduled visits to the 
emergency room of hospitals. Secondly, health services for inpatients have 
different features and consume more resources than outpatient services, 
therefore, inpatient health services is another output of hospitals. This study 
follows the argument of Granneman et al. (1986) that the inpatient day factor is 
a more medically homogeneous unit than the inpatient factor; therefore the use 
of inpatient days (Y2) can provide a more favourable hospital output. Finally, the 
surgical operation output (Y3) is used because it requires different combinations 
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of inputs than medical care, such as specialised equipment and personnel. The 
sample hospitals in this study are the main tertiary and secondary referral 
health centres in the health system, hence, surgical operations are obviously an 
important type of health service provided. All of these output measures are 
aggregate, and measuring hospital outputs by such aggregate variables does 
not capture case-mix variation and quality of services provided. Even though 
the use of a case-mix index such as diagnosis-related-groups (DRGs) applied in 
many health systems may handle the problem, the absence of data makes its 
use limited in Vietnam as well as in most developing countries (Zere et al., 
2006; Pilyavsky et al., 2006).  
 
Regarding the input variables, inputs used in assessment of hospital efficiency 
often fall into two categories: recurrent resources and capital resources. The 
numbers of personnel and hospital beds are considered as proxies for recurrent 
and capital resources used in hospitals, respectively; and therefore they are 
widely employed in the studies of hospital efficiency (e.g. Ferrari, 2006; Chen, 
2006; Harris II et al., 2000). This notion of hospital inputs is also supported by 
Worthington (2004) in the review of health sector efficiency literature. The use 
of these inputs can be explained by the fact that the hospital production 
process, as mentioned above, is largely administrative, delivers the health care 
services, and extensively uses the qualified labour and beds to produce health 
outputs.  
 
According to Byrnes and Valdmanis (1994) and Steinmann and Zweifel (2003), 
production needs to be defined in terms of actual quantities of inputs used 
rather than available stocks. Hence, this study employed actual inputs that are 
broadly consistent with other studies of hospital efficiency (e.g. Ersoy et al., 
1997; Chang et al., 2004; Zere et al., 2006).  The number of actual hospital 
beds used to provide health services and surgical operations are employed as 
an overall indicator of the capital input (X1). However, due to unavailability of 
disaggregate data on personnel, only the total number of hospital’s personnel, 
including physicians and non-physicians working in the hospitals, is used as a 
proxy of human capital. In some literature, the operating expenses after 
excluding the payroll, capital (bed) expenses and depreciation have also been 
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used as an input in measuring hospital efficiency (Harrison and Sexton, 2006; 
Zere et al., 2006). However, in the context of Vietnamese health system, there 
is no clear separation of operational expenses away from bed expenses and 
depreciation, therefore, the use of this input factor can cause the double 
counting issue. As a result, this input is excluded. 
 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the input variables used in the 
efficiency measurement, including mean, standard deviation and extreme 
values over the period 1998-2006. Descriptive statistics of the inputs suggest 
increases in the average amount of personnel and hospital beds used as well 
as increases in the amount of hospital outputs, including outpatient visits, 
inpatient days and surgical operations over the sample period.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables  
 
 
5.3 Results 
 
Efficiency Results 
In this stage, the efficiency of 101 general hospitals in Vietnam is examined in 
terms of their ability to provide outputs with minimum input consumption using 
the DEA-BCC model. The results are presented in Table 2. As the BCC model 
assumes variable returns to scale, the average variable-returns-to-scale 
efficiency (pure technical efficiency) for the total sample hospitals by year is 
reported. For completeness, the average efficiency score under the assumption 
of constant returns to scale (overall technical efficiency) and scale efficiency are 
also represented.  
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Inputs   
Beds (X1) 424.53 233.19 60 1567 
Personnel (X2) 455.99 306.14 35 2830 
Outputs    
Outpatient visits (Y1) 9496.93         24512.54 80       221221 
Inpatient days (Y2) 167961.97       106327.33       15195      850183 
Surgical Operations 
(Y3) 5421.25           5886.50 86        37583 
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 Table 2: Annual Average Efficiency Scores 
 
VRSTE CRSTE SCALE Number of VRSTE = 1 
1998 0.710 0.652 0.919 9 
1999 0.672 0.599 0.898 5 
2000 0.677 0.620 0.920 6 
2001 0.685 0.619 0.906 8 
2002 0.704 0.635 0.907 9 
2003 0.731 0.661 0.909 11 
2004 0.722 0.674 0.934 13 
2005 0.781 0.748 0.958 12 
2006 0.801 0.767 0.960 19 
Average 0.720 0.664 0.924  
 
The results reveal that the average pure technical efficiency increased from 
71% in 1998 to 80.1% in 2006. The efficiency had a slight decrease initially 
(1998-1999), and then increased steadily between 2000 and 2003 before falling 
down again during the period 2003-2004. Afterwards, it rose sharply for the last 
two years. Overall, Vietnamese hospitals have experienced an upward trend in 
pure technical efficiency during the sample period 1998-2006. In addition, the 
average overall technical efficiency across the entire sample period for all 
hospitals was 66.4%, and the scale efficiency was 92.4%. This implies that the 
levels of hospital efficiency scores are getting better over time. An explanation 
for this could lie in the fact that further changes in health insurance measures 
were introduced in 1998, 2002 and 2005, and autonomy in public hospitals was 
granted in 2002.  
 
Furthermore, pure technical efficiency is investigated in terms of location and 
hospital types. The results are presented in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. 
Table 3 shows that the central hospitals have experienced an increase in 
technical efficiency from 2002, after a slight reduction in 1999. The average 
pure technical efficiency of central hospitals increased from 66.1% in 1998 to 
81.8% in 2006, whilst the average pure technical efficiency of provincial 
hospitals increased by 8.4% over the sample period. Overall, the provincial 
hospitals have performed better than their central counterparts during the period 
under consideration. Table 4 shows that the mean efficiency scores of hospitals 
located in North East, South East and Mekong River Delta regions are 74%, 
74.1% and 73.2%, respectively, which are slightly higher than those of hospitals 
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located in other regions. These results imply that hospitals located in the North 
East, South East and Mekong River Delta regions have generally performed 
better than hospitals from other regions. These results seem to suggest that 
changes in financial and managerial measures may have improved the 
technical efficiency of public hospitals and that the location factor and the 
hospital types may also have affected hospital efficiency. The impact of these 
factors will be further investigated in the second-stage analysis.  
 
 Table 3: Annual Average Technical Efficiency Scores by Hospital Types 
 
Central hospitals Provincial hospitals All hospitals 
1998 0.661 0.715 0.710 
1999 0.650 0.674 0.672 
2000 0.671 0.677 0.677 
2001 0.672 0.686 0.685 
2002 0.694 0.705 0.704 
2003 0.721 0.732 0.731 
2004 0.743 0.720 0.722 
2005 0.809 0.779 0.781 
2006 0.818 0.799 0.801 
Mean 0.715 0.721 0.720 
 
As noted earlier in Section 4, the DEA efficiency results are sensitive to outliers 
and measurement errors. Therefore, this stage analyses the robustness of the 
efficiency scores using the jackknife technique (Magnussen, 1996; Zere et al., 
2006). The efficient hospitals are removed one at a time from the analysis and 
the efficiency measures are recalculated. The similarity of the efficiency ranking 
between the model prior to deleting any efficient hospitals and new models, 
having removed each of the efficient hospitals, is then tested by using the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients. If the efficient hospitals are influential, 
the results should be varied and not correlated. Subsequently, the value of 0 
implies that there is no correlation between the rankings. The value of 1 (or -1) 
indicates that the ranking are exactly the same (or reverse), implying no 
influence of outliers on hospital efficiency.  
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Table 4: Annual Average Technical Efficiency Scores by Regions 
 
 
Red 
River 
Delta 
North 
East 
North 
West 
North 
Central 
Coast 
South 
Central 
Coast 
Central 
Highland 
South 
East 
Mekong 
River 
Delta 
1998 0.704 0.695 0.666 0.756 0.684 0.668 0.707 0.744 
1999 0.651 0.648 0.700 0.656 0.638 0.602 0.694 0.716 
2000 0.619 0.728 0.680 0.634 0.615 0.612 0.729 0.679 
2001 0.655 0.719 0.595 0.667 0.658 0.609 0.707 0.708 
2002 0.694 0.737 0.622 0.669 0.701 0.624 0.722 0.711 
2003 0.696 0.747 0.677 0.652 0.725 0.712 0.752 0.767 
2004 0.691 0.740 0.634 0.664 0.688 0.726 0.757 0.746 
2005 0.762 0.806 0.749 0.753 0.803 0.825 0.809 0.749 
2006 0.794 0.840 0.890 0.778 0.804 0.824 0.793 0.767 
 
Jackknifing analysis has been done on a year-by-year basis for the above pure 
technical efficiency and overall technical efficiency. The results1 yield the value 
ranges of Spearman rank order correlation coefficient from 0.998 to 1, which 
are significantly different from zero at 1% level of significance. This suggests 
that no efficient hospital influences the efficiency of other hospitals and the 
efficiencies obtained from the sample are reasonably robust, at least on an 
ordinal scale of ranking of the hospitals.  
 
In order to shed further light on whether the efficiencies of the sample hospitals 
changed with the further changes of financial and managerial measures in the 
hospital system, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test is undertaken. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no median difference in technical efficiency across 
the 9 years under consideration. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one 
subgroup has a different distribution. The results are presented in Table 5. As 
shown in Table 5, the chi-square results for overall technical efficiency, pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency are 138.2, 85.5 and 122.6, respectively, 
which are greater than the 0.01 level of significance. This implies that at least 
one pair of the efficiency medians is not equal, and that the technical efficiency 
in the sample hospitals changed with the further introduction of financial and 
managerial changes in the Vietnamese health system.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Due to the large number of Spearman rank correlation coefficients estimated in individual years, the 
results will be available upon request. 
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Table 5: Kruskal-Wallis Test of DEA Efficiency by Year 
Year Rank Sum of VRSTE 
Rank Sum of 
CRSTE 
Rank Sum of 
SCALE 
1998 44391       44185.5 42150 
1999 35832            32593   35397.5 
2000   37219.5            36640   42394.5 
2001 40216            38191 38327 
2002 43325            41176   40953.5 
2003   47569.5            46034.5 38780 
2004   46097.5            48164 66861 
2005 57718            61878.5 53498 
2006   61226.5            64732.5   55233.5 
Chi-squared 85.504 138.261 122.569 
Probability 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
Malmquist total factor productivity results 
The results of the Malmquist indices and all of its components are presented in 
Table 6 below. It includes the geometric means of all the indices as well as the 
cumulative indices for the entire period 1998-2006. The results of the Malmquist 
productivity indices show that the general hospitals have on average 
experienced positive technical efficiency change during the sample period. The 
geometric mean of technical efficiency is 1.022, which represents an increase of 
2.2% per year. This suggests that on average the hospitals are getting closer 
(experiencing efficiency improvement) to the frontier. However, the hospitals 
have on average experienced negative technological change during the sample 
period, thus offsetting somewhat the technical efficiency progress. The 
geometric mean technological change is 0.992, representing a decrease of 
0.8% per year. This implies that the production frontiers have generally not 
achieved favourable shifts over the entire sample period. Accordingly, the 
combination of progression in technical efficiency change and regression in 
technological change is an increase in total productivity over time, with an 
average annual productivity growth rate of 1.4% per year.    
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Table 6: Malmquist Productivity Indices and its Components 
Year 
Technic
al 
efficienc
y 
change 
(EFFCH) 
Technologic
al change 
(TECHCH) 
Change in 
pure 
technical 
efficiency 
(PECH) 
Change in 
scale 
efficiency 
(SECH) 
Total factor 
productivit
y change 
(TFPCH) 
1998 – 1999 0.922 1.045 0.946 0.975 0.964 
1999 – 2000 1.033 0.953 1.005 1.028 0.984 
2000 – 2001 0.995 1.023 1.012 0.983 1.018 
2001 – 2002 1.028 1.008 1.028 1.000 1.037 
2002 – 2003 1.040 0.949 1.038 1.003 0.987 
2003 – 2004 1.019 0.963 0.988 1.032 0.981 
2004 – 2005 1.119 0.961 1.089 1.028 1.075 
2005 – 2006 1.029 1.040 1.026 1.002 1.069 
Mean 1.022 0.992 1.016 1.006 1.014 
1998-2006* 1.189 0.938 1.133 1.050 1.114 
Note:  * Cumulative indices for period 1998-2006 
Other indices are geometric average of the entire hospital sample 
 
 
6. The Second Stage Analysis 
 
6.1 The Econometric Model 
As mentioned in Section 4, the DEA efficiency scores are regressed on a vector 
of explanatory variables. There are two regression models commonly used to 
investigate the determinants of technical efficiency: Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression and Tobit regression (Tobin, 1958). However, because of 
efficient DMUs having a DEA efficiency score of 1 and a relatively large number 
of fully efficient DMU being estimated, the distribution of efficiency is truncated 
above from unity. As a result, the dependent variable (efficiency scores) in the 
regression model becomes a limited dependent variable. In such a case, 
applying OLS regression is inappropriate (Gujarati, 2003, p.616) so a Tobit 
censored regression model is used instead (Chilingerian, 1995; Chilingerian 
and Sherman, 2004). Therefore, a panel Tobit regression model is employed in 
this study to examine whether and how environmental factors such as 
regulatory changes in financial and managerial structure and hospital 
characteristics affect hospital efficiency. These independent variables are three 
regulatory change factors: the user fee measure (UFR), the health insurance 
measure (HIR), the hospital autonomy measure (AUD), and five hospital 
characteristic factors: location (NE, NW, NCC, SCC, CH, SE, and MRD), 
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occupancy rate (OCC), average length of stays (ALOS), and hospital type 
(TYPE). In order to normalise the DEA distribution and convenience for 
computation, the DEA efficiency scores derived from equation (1) are 
transformed into inefficiency scores and left a censoring point concentrated at 
zero by taking the reciprocal of DEA efficiency score minus one.  
1Inefficiency score = 1
Technical  efficiency  score 
 
− 
 
  
 (3) 
 
Hence, the following panel regression model is specified to conduct Tobit 
analysis: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13
                     
INEFF UFR HIR AUD NE NW NCC SCC
CH SE MRD OCC ALOS TYPE
β β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β
ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
 (4) 
where: 
 INEFF: The reciprocal of technical efficiency minus one 
 UFR: The ratio of revenues from user fees to total revenues 
 HIR: The ratio of revenues from health insurance to total revenues 
 AUD: The autonomy dummy, AUD equals to 1 if a hospital operating in 
 period 2003-2006; otherwise 0 
 NE: Equal to 1 if a hospital is located in the North East region;   
 otherwise 0 
 NW: Equal to 1 if a hospital is located in the North West region;   
 otherwise 0 
 NCC: Equal to 1 if a hospital is located in the North Central Coast;  
 otherwise 0 
 SCC: Equal to 1 if a hospital is located in the South Central Coast;  
 otherwise 0 
 CH: Equal to 1 if a hospital is located in the Central Highland region;  
 otherwise 0 
 SE: Equal to 1 if a hospital is located in the South East region;   
 otherwise 0 
 26 
 MRD: Equal to 1 if a hospital is located in the Mekong River Delta;  
  otherwise 0 
 OCC: Bed occupancy rate of a hospital 
 ALOS: Average length of stays of a hospital 
 TYPE: Equal to 1 if a hospital is the general provincial hospital; otherwise 
 0 
 
A summary of descriptive statistics for the inefficiency scores and the potential 
explanatory variables used in the regression estimation is presented in Table 7. 
The dummy explanatory variables such as autonomy, location and hospital type 
are not presented in this table. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Tobit Regression Analysis 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Maximum Minimum 
INEFF 0.447 0.291 1.511 0 
UFR 0.414 0.137 0.843 0.063 
HIR 0.165 0.077 0.450 0.014 
OCC 106.472 20.765 198.16 36.17 
ALOS 7.746 2.297 19.889 3.111 
 
 
Coelli et al. (2005, p.194) indicate that in DEA second-stage methodology the 
regression analysis for environmental factors against the DEA efficiency scores 
may have biased results. This occurs if the explanatory variables used in the 
regression model are highly correlated with the variables used in the DEA 
model. Therefore, in order to avoid biased results, correlations between hospital 
inputs and outputs and a set of explanatory variables are calculated. The 
Pearson correlation coefficient has been used to investigate the correlation 
between explanatory variables as well as the correlation between explanatory 
variables and hospital inputs and outputs. The results2 suggest that there is no 
strong correlation between these variables, and it is unlikely there will be problems 
of multicollinearity in the regression model. 
 
                                                 
2
 The results are available upon request 
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As mentioned in Section 1, the Vietnamese health system has been 
restructured through the health sector reform process. During this process, 
there has been a range of regulatory measures implemented. Among the 
changes in government regulations in the health care system, the user fees, 
health insurance and autonomy are directly related to the operations of public 
hospitals. In addition to the state budget, the introduction of user fees and 
health insurance has provided two other financial sources for hospitals, 
resulting in change in the financing structure of public hospitals. The granting of 
autonomy has reduced the control of the government on public hospitals, 
thereby changing the hospitals’ managerial structure. As this research focuses 
on evaluating the performance of public hospitals in relation to such changes, 
these three changes in regulatory measures are investigated, and thus, three 
testable hypotheses are set up as follows:  
 
The positive relationship between user fees and hospital efficiency is expected. 
Chang (1998) indicates that as health reform is focused on changes in the 
financing mechanism of public hospitals, public hospitals cannot receive funds 
from the government to break even. As a result, in order to become financially 
independent, each hospital has to reduce its operating costs by improving its 
efficiency. Furthermore, the fee levels or payment rates approved by the 
Ministry of Health or local government for Vietnamese hospitals are often set 
below the actual costs of health services, resulting in the increase of financial 
pressures on hospitals. As mentioned by Rosko (1999), in such a case the user 
fee share of revenues will be inversely associated with inefficiency.  
 
The expected impacts on inefficiency scores of health insurance measures 
cannot be easily predicted. This is because health insurance is also a financial 
measure, which changes the financing structure of hospitals; therefore, the 
above justification of user fees can be applied to health insurance. This means 
that health insurance may have a positive effect on hospital efficiency. 
However, Biørn et al. (2003) and Chen (2006) indicate that the payment method 
based on a low powered fee-for-service system may give rise to serious 
inefficiencies in the hospital sector through raising the prices of health services 
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and therefore reducing incentives to control costs. Accordingly, health insurance 
may have a positive or negative effect on inefficiency.  
 
The relationship between autonomy and hospital efficiency, represented by 
dummy variable, is expected to be positive. Greater autonomy makes public 
hospitals become more similar to those in a market system. Furthermore, the 
more management decisions are under the control of hospital managers, the 
more incentive hospitals have to improve performance. This means that the 
autonomy measure encourages hospitals to improve their efficiency. This 
positive correlation between autonomy and organisations’ efficiency has been 
found in some studies on public organisations of Perelman and Pestieau (1988) 
and Gathon and Perelman (1992), among others. 
 
Furthermore, some hospital characteristics are also examined. The results from 
the DEA efficiency measurement in Section 5 show that hospitals located in 
some regions such as the North East, South East and the Mekong River Delta 
are more efficient than hospitals from five other regions. Therefore, it is 
expected that hospitals from the North East, South East and Mekong River 
Delta regions have a higher operating efficiency than hospitals from the Red 
River Delta, North West, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, and Central 
Highland regions. As far as the hospital type is concerned, it is expected that 
the provincial hospitals are relatively more efficient than the central 
counterparts. This is because the central hospitals are more tightly under the 
control of the Ministry of Health than the provincial hospitals and central 
hospitals are the major teaching and tertiary health centres. These roles may 
require a large consumption of resources and higher administration costs. In 
addition, as hospital beds are a capital resource of a hospital, it therefore seems 
reasonable to assume that hospitals with greater occupancy rates are likely to 
use this resource more efficiently than those with lower occupancy rates. 
Accordingly, the bed occupancy rate is expected to have positive effects on 
hospital efficiency. However, the occupancy rate is related to the length of stays 
in such a way that high occupancy rate can be due to long stays for a single 
treatment. Therefore the average length of stays (ALOS) is also included in the 
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Tobit model. It is expected to be negatively associated with hospital efficiency, 
thus showing that the shorter the length of stay, the more efficient hospitals are. 
 
6.2 Results 
It is important to note that the potential explanatory variables are not highly 
correlated with each other or with the hospital input and output variables used in 
the first-stage DEA analysis and that the dependent variables in the Tobit model 
are the inefficiency scores. Therefore, a positive sign of coefficients indicates an 
increase in inefficiency whilst the negative sign implies a reduction of 
inefficiency. In other words, a positive coefficient is associated with the 
efficiency decline and a negative coefficient is related with the efficiency 
increase. The results of the Tobit model for explaining determinants of technical 
inefficiency scores are given in Table 8. As can be seen in Table 8, all three 
regulatory change variables significantly affect hospital efficiency. However, 
whilst the user fees (UFR) and autonomy (AUD) variables yield negative 
coefficients, the health insurance variable (HIR) yields a positive coefficient.  
 
The share of user fees in total revenues (UFR), representing the change in 
financial measure of hospitals consistently yields a negative coefficient as 
expected, and is significantly different from zero. This result suggests that the 
application of user fees not only encourages health service provision but also 
leads to some additional technical efficiency. It also implies that hospitals that 
provide a lot of health services through the user fees method seem to be more 
careful not to waste resources because the charges for health services provided 
is less than the actual costs.  
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates of Tobit Model 
     Note:***  indicates significant different from zero at the 1% 
 *     indicates significant different from zero at the 10% 
 
 
The coefficient estimate for health insurance is positive and statistically 
significant in explaining the technical inefficiency of the sampled hospitals. This 
suggests that the provision of health care under the health insurance schemes 
is inversely associated with hospital efficiency. A possible explanation for a 
negative impact is that the increase in output levels due to greater demand, and 
from the hospital an overuse of health services to maximisie their revenues, 
was offset by the shortage of incentives to control costs in the low powered fee-
for-service system. The negative effect may also be explained by some 
constraints during the implementation process. In particular, the decline in 
efficiency may be attributed to the following factors. First, the payments by the 
health insurer, Vietnam Social Security Institute, to hospitals are frequently 
delayed, thereby discouraging the provision of health services for insured 
patients and causing some financial difficulty for hospitals. Second, some fees 
for health services are set differently in different regulatory documents, resulting 
in inconsistent fees – both those charged by hospitals and those paid by the 
insurer to hospitals. In addition, many new advanced and expensive health 
services have not been agreed to be paid for by the insurer. All of these 
 
Parameter Coefficients Z-statistics 
UFR β1 -0.114 -2.300*** 
HIR β2  0.270  3.130*** 
AUD β3 -0.087 -8.510*** 
NE β4 -0.118 -5.750*** 
NW β5 -0.190 -7.090*** 
NCC β6 -0.008 -0.340 
SCC β7  0.141  5.540*** 
CH β8 -0.089 -3.100*** 
SE β
 9 -0.158 -7.300*** 
MRD β10 -0.142 -5.570*** 
OCC β11 -0.011 -40.460*** 
ALOS β12 -0.003 -1.050 
TYPE β13 -0.036 -1.710* 
Constant   1.819  35.030*** 
Log Likelihood  355.9933  
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constraints may increase administration costs and operating costs for the 
hospitals. 
 
Meanwhile, the coefficient representing the autonomy dummy is negative and 
significant. The sign of this coefficient is as expected. This implies that the 
granting of autonomy to public hospitals is correlated with a higher level of 
hospital efficiency. It also suggests that the new regulation appears to have 
created a more favourable management environment and that hospitals have 
responded positively to their new incentive environment in the predicted way. 
Indeed, the new regulations are likely to have encouraged the hospitals to try to 
make more efficient use of their human resources, to control expenditure more 
tightly and provide higher service quality. As a result, the more management 
decisions that come under the control of hospital managers, the better their 
hospitals can perform. 
 
Most of the regional dummy variables are statistically significant, indicating 
general patterns of efficiency by geographical location when hospitals are 
compared to others of a similar size. Compared with the Red River Delta region, 
the hospitals located in the North East, South East and Mekong River Delta 
regions are more efficient. These regions are wealthier and more densely 
populated and have more public and private hospitals located within them than 
other regions. Therefore, the negative coefficients suggest that hospitals 
located in these regions are likely to have more favourable conditions to 
improve their efficiency than hospitals located in other regions. In particular, the 
density of hospitals in the North East, South East and Mekong River Delta 
regions is considerably high, implying a low market concentration and high 
competitive pressures. This may result in better performance for hospitals 
located in these regions. Furthermore, patients from these regions may have a 
greater ability to pay for hospital services than patients from poorer regions, 
resulting in a higher demand of health services from hospitals. People in lower 
income regions, on the other hand, tend to prefer self-medication, use over-the-
counter drugs or traditional care due to the lower cost of these alternative 
treatments.  
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The effects of other hospital-specific characteristics, including occupancy rate 
and hospital type, are clearly significant in explaining inefficiency. Occupancy 
rate measures the utilisation of a hospital’s beds, therefore, keeping the beds 
full means that hospitals have produced a lot of outputs (inpatient days, surgical 
operations) from their available inputs (beds and personnel). Given the way in 
which efficiency is defined and measured, the bed occupancy rate has a 
statistically significant negative coefficient as expected. This finding implies that 
the higher the ratio of a hospital’s beds used relative to other hospitals, the 
higher the efficiency of that hospital is.  
 
The coefficient associated with hospital type is negative and significant as 
expected. It is important to note that the central hospitals are used as the base; 
hence this finding indicates that central hospitals operating under direct 
administration of the Ministry of Health have significant positive contributions to 
technical inefficiency. In other words, the central hospitals are less efficient than 
their provincial counterparts. This result is supported by the DEA efficiency 
results that the provincial hospitals had higher efficiency scores than their 
central counterparts. A possible explanation is that central hospitals are tertiary 
care centres, which provide more complicated and higher quality health 
services than provincial counterparts. Furthermore, the central hospitals are 
also the main centres that undertake the teaching and researching mission in 
the health care system. This may result in the extensive use of resources by 
central hospitals. However, due to the unavailability of data on service 
complexity, service quality and teaching and researching mission, these factors 
cannot be tested.  
 
Finally, the regression result indicates that the average length of stay (ALOS) is 
negative in explaining technical inefficiency, which goes against the a priori 
hypothesis. However, it is not statistically significant.  
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This study is an attempt to provide an empirical picture of the efficiency of 
Vietnamese hospitals during the period of reform process and the impacts of 
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regulatory changes and hospital-specific characteristics on hospital efficiency. 
The findings revealed that the productivity and efficiency of Vietnamese 
hospitals improved over the period 1998-2006, with a progress of total factor 
productivity of 1.4% per year. The regulatory changes in financial and 
managerial structure were found to have mixed impacts on hospital efficiency. 
The user fees and autonomy measures increased technical efficiency, whilst the 
implementation of health insurance reduced hospital efficiency. Furthermore, 
provincial hospitals were found to be more technically efficient than their central 
counterparts; and hospitals located in the North East, South East and Mekong 
River Delta regions were reported to perform better than hospitals from other 
regions.  
 
Overall, these findings suggest that the Vietnamese hospitals have benefited 
from the regulatory changes instituted during the reform process. These 
findings may have the following managerial and policy implications. First, this 
analysis identifies policies that are effective in bringing about changes in 
productivity and efficiency, thereby assisting policy makers in choosing the best 
regulatory framework for the ongoing health sector reform process. It also 
provides a necessary step towards a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of 
the health reform programme on the performance of the health care system. 
Second, this analysis shows that measurement of hospital performance cannot 
simply look at the efficiency measurement itself. It should also include the 
assessment of relevant hospital operating characteristics, as all these factors 
are significantly associated with hospital efficiency.  
 
The study can be further expanded by comparing the results obtained in this 
research, based on the DEA method, with those from alternative techniques 
such as econometric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Further research on the 
relationship between quality and efficiency or efficiency and equity may also be 
worthy of examination. Further research in all these objectives would be able to 
provide a comprehensive picture of hospital performance.  
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